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a b s t r a c t 
The development of trust is a major challenge for the governance of public private infrastructure megaprojects. 
Contractual pre-arrangements should provide a blueprint for collaborative behavior and trust development but 
the characters of megaprojects challenge such arrangements. This longitudinal study explores practices of trust 
development in the collaboration of commissioner and contractor consortia in the Dutch road infrastructure 
megaproject ‘Schiphol, Amsterdam and Almere’ (SAA). The findings show that six different types of workshops 
have been used to intervene in the collaboration of project partners in order to develop trust. The study contributes 
to the debate on governance in megaprojects showing how governance arrangement are enacted in the daily 
practice in megaprojects. To buffer the potential loss of trust through conflicts, project partners negotiated for a 



















































The governance of megaprojects has received growing academic at-
ention over recent decades ( Ahola, Russka & Artto, 2014 ; Müller, 2012 ;
itsis, Sankaran & Gudergan, 2014 ; Sanderson, 2012 ). Megaprojects are
haracterized by their size, budget, structural complexity, uncertainty,
nvironmental impact and the involvement of a large number of public
nd private partners with diverse interests and sometimes conflicting
oals. As megaprojects are frequently conflict-ridden ( Van Marrewijk
t al., 2016 ), they require specific governance arrangements ( Brunet &
ubry, 2016 ; Clegg, Pitsis & Rura-Polley, 2002 ; Miller & Hobbs, 2005 ).
roject governance is here defined as tailored arrangements defining a
hared set of coordination, procedures and rules, which together has to
lign the conflicting goals of participating organizations towards a joint
oal ( Ahola et al., 2014 ). These governance arrangements have to en-
ure smooth collaboration of public and private partners in megaprojects
 Miller & Hobbs, 2005 ). 
The development of trust is a major challenge for the governance of
egaprojects ( Maurer, 2010 ). Trust in a project context is here defined
s “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another
arty based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular
ction important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
ontrol the other party ” ( Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995 : 712). Trust∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Architecture and Management of the Bu
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263-7863/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved. mplies that actors are willing to proceed without defending, buffering,
r protecting themselves against risks and that they accept uncertainty
 Latusk & Vlaar, 2018 ). Project partners consider relational norms, val-
es and social rules, informally shared by project coalition members,
s crucial for maintaining their commitment in a long term contract
 Benitez-Avila, Hartmann, & Dewulf, 2018 ). Acting on trust thus be-
omes an ‘organizing principle’ of governing the interactions between
rganizations, which is constituted by a set of practices that (re)produce
rust as a meaningful pattern of interaction ( Sydow, 1998 ). Practices
n projects are here understood as dynamic and provisional activities
hat require some form of participation ( Blomquist, Hällgren & Nilsson,
010 ). 
However, this process of trust development for governing megapro-
ects is not yet well understood ( Lau & Rowlinson, 2009 ; Maurer, 2010 ;
wärd, 2016 ). The limited duration and predefined end of megapro-
ects affect the trust development process, highlighting the development
f swift trust ( Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996 ). The development of
rust is understood as a process that changes over time ( Swärd, 2016 ),
n which cooperation between project members is anticipated upon due
o trust, which is then reciprocated with further cooperation validating
hat trust ( Munns, 1995 ). Swärd (2016) focuses on events of trust devel-
pment in inter-organizational projects, but fails to make clear how this
orks out at the work floor. Therefore, in-depth qualitative approachesild Environment, Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands. 
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re needed to explore the development of trust in projects and the ex-
eriences of participants ( Benitez-Avila, Hartmann, & Dewulf, 2018 ;
atusk & Vlaar, 2018 ; Maurer, 2010 ). Möllering and Sydow (2019) con-
rm the need for longitudinal research on the dynamics of trust in gen-
ral and especially across organizational boundaries. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to investigate the practices of trust
evelopment used to enhance the collaboration between public and pri-
ate partners in the governance of an infrastructure megaproject. To ful-
ll this aim, we executed a longitudinal study (2014 to 2019) on trust
evelopment in the road infrastructure megaproject ‘Schiphol, Amster-
am and Almere’ (SAA). With a budget of € 4.5 billion, SAA is at the
ime of study the largest infrastructure project in the Netherlands, cov-
ring 63 km of very busy highways. Our unit of analysis are infrastruc-
ure megaprojects. Data was collected by means of an auto-ethnographic
eld study ( Anderson, 2006 ) and included interviews. Autoethnography
s relatively uncommon in project studies, but an excellent method for
btaining a longitudinal in-depth understanding of trust development
n a megaproject. 
The study contributes to the debate on governance in megapro-
ects ( Benitez-Avila, Hartmann, & Dewulf, 2018 ; Brunet & Aubry, 2016 ;
üller, 2012 ) showing how normative governance arrangement are en-
cted in the daily practice in megaprojects. Furthermore, the study con-
ributes to the debate on trust building in megaprojects ( Kadefors, 2004 ;
unns, 1995 ; Swärd, 2016 ; Wong, Then & Skitmore, 2000 ) with the no-
ion that workshops have transformational potential to build trust in the
ollaboration between commissioner and contractors. To buffer the po-
ential loss of trust through conflicts, these organizations negotiated for
 balanced reciprocal relationship, which the simultaneous exchange of
quivalent resources without delay ( Sahlins, 1973 ). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss the theo-
etical debate on project governance and its relation with trust develop-
ent between public and private partners in megaprojects. We do not
evelop a conceptual model of causal relations, but of trust development
n public private collaboration in megaprojects. In the method section
e highlight the applying an auto-ethnographic methodology, unique
n project studies, and discuss the measures that we took to mitigate
ts related risks. In the findings, the workshops related to four stages
f trust development in the governance of the studied megaproject are
resented and their effectiveness discussed. In the discussion section
he implication of the findings for the debate on trust development and
overnance are discussed. And finally, in the conclusions we indicate
he importance of organizing joint reflection between commissioner and
ontractor consortia on the governance of megaprojects. 
. Governance, collaboration and trust in megaprojects 
.1. Governance and collaboration in megaprojects 
The debate on project governance has been dominated by litera-
ure on governance systems based upon behavioral and outcome con-
rol in terms of budget, time and scope, on project partner roles ( Turner
 Keegan, 2001 ), and on contracting ( Müller, 2012 ). In their study,
hola et al. (2014) distinguish two streams of literature. In the first
tream project governance is understood as externally imposed by the
rganization on the project to define and monitor standards, procedures
nd rules. This is what Latusk and Vlaar (2018) call the calculative ap-
roach, which understands rational actors undertaking actions to re-
uce risks. Governance is then defined in contractual terms of externally
mposed inter-organizational collaboration between public and private
artners to ensure a consistent and predictable delivery by contractors
ithin contractual limitations ( Müller, 2012 ). Such an approach is ex-
ected to provide a blueprint for collaborative behavior, and encourages
ctors to specify all the obligations of each party in advance, in prepa-
ation for possible future events ( Benitez-Avila, Hartmann, & Dewulf,
018 ). These contractual pre-arrangements seek to address the many
nterests that are at stake ( Müller, 2012 ). However, such contracts are352 obust to unpredictability of change in an environment over time but
ot to uncertainty and ambiguity in perceptions of the environmental
 Carson, Madhok & Wu, 2006 ). 
In the second stream project governance is tailored through ar-
angements that define shared sets of coordination, procedures and
ules which are expected to be followed. This is called the relational
pproach ( Latusk & Vlaar, 2018 ), which assumes that actors cannot
itigate or anticipate all risks, but nonetheless maintain collaborative
elationships. Although contracts should provide a blueprint for col-
aborative behavior ( Benitez-Avila, Hartmann, & Dewulf, 2018 ), when
roject partners work together relations become complex and challeng-
ng. As the relationship forms and unfolds over time assumptions about
hared goals, responsibilities and action can become increasingly vex-
ng ( Sanderson, 2012 ; Van Marrewijk et al., 2016 ). Therefore, rela-
ional aspects mediate the effect of contracts ( Benitez-Avila, Hartmann,
 Dewulf, 2018 ). 
Sanderson (2012) criticizes the strict governance regimes ( Miller &
obbs, 2005 ) of both approaches. According to him, they create an il-
usion of foresightedness, in which the commissioner consciously tries
o build a capacity to deal with future events into governance struc-
ures. However, historical relations between project partners, the so-
alled ‘shadows of the past’ ( Poppo, Zheng Zhou & Ryu, 2008 ), influence
aily governance practices. Sanderson (2012) identifies these gover-
ance practices as causes for the problematic collaboration in megapro-
ects. Project actors are often unable to respond flexible to inevitable
urbulence of inter-organizational complexity, ambiguity, uncertainty
nd conflicts faced by megaproject actors with diverse and competing
roject rationalities ( Miller & Hobbs, 2005 ). The micro-processes can
elp to better understand how practices of governance shape the ac-
ions of project employees and vice versa (e.g. Müller, 2012 ). Therefore,
runet (2019 : 294) suggests to concern over “what people do in relation
o project governance and how this is influenced by and influences their
rganization and institution context ”. 
.2. Stages of trust development 
The complex concept of trust has slowly attracted attention from
roject scholars ( Kadefors, 2004 ; Müller, Andersen & Kvalnes, 2013 ;
unns, 1995 ; Pinto, Slevin & English, 2009 ; Swärd, 2016 ; Wong et al.,
000 ; Wong, Cheung & Yui, 2008 ). For example, Pinto et al. (2009) pro-
ide a rather simple framework which understands positive owner and
ontractor trust to result in satisfaction over collaboration and project
utcome. Interesting and aligned with the calculative and relational ap-
roach of governance, Rosseau et al. (1998) distinguish between cal-
ulative and normative trust. Calculative trust is impersonal and based
n a structure of rewards and penalties Rousseau et al. (1998) . This is
hat Wong et al. (2008) call system based trust, assuming trust to be
ased upon financial agreements and legal systems. Finally, Das and
eng (2001) names this competence trust, which is the trust in the tech-
ical competence of partners. These interpretations of calculative trust
an be related to the calculative governance approach. 
Normative trust is related to personal relations and based
pon past behavior and shared identity Rousseau et al. (1998) .
ong et al. (2008) call this affect based trust, which is based on the
motional bond between persons. Das and Teng (2001) names tis good-
ill trust, which is the trust in someone’s loyalty, good intentions and
ntegrity. Normative trust is frequently named as a requirement for but
lso as a result of collaboration (e.g. Smets, Wels & van Loon, 1999 ).
hen normative trust is missing, perceived discrepancies between ex-
ectations and actual behavior can result in power struggles and loss of
rust ( Van Marrewijk et al., 2016 ). Furthermore, Maurer (2010) found
hat when team members know each other from prior collaboration and
hen secured benefits and clear and measurable reward criteria existed,
he development of trust was fostered. These understandings of norma-
ive can be related to the relational governance approach. 






























































































































a  Calculative and normative trust should be understood not in isolation
ut as an entangled development over time following different stages
 Latusk & Vlaar, 2018 ; Swärd, 2016 ). Although they do not distinguish
alculative and normative trust, Schilke and Cook (2013) suggest that
he development of trust relations coevolves with partnership stages.
he first stage is initiation, an exploration phase in which partners are
dentified, evaluated, and selected and clues are gathered about trust-
orthiness. Second is the negotiation stage where negotiations among
rospective partners take place and partners becoming acquainted dur-
ng interpersonal interactions. The third stage, formation, involves set-
ing up the partnership by committing various types of resources by
ransferring trust. The fourth and final stage is operations, in which
artner organizations collaborate and implement the agreement in the
peration stage resulting in institutionalizing trust. In these early stages
f partnership, institutional based trust has been found to be impor-
ant ( Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011 ). In the case of our study, the Dutch
ublic and private partners have a long history of collaboration which
n which conflicts, mutual stereotyping and collusion have weakened
nstitutional trust in the Dutch infrastructure sector ( Priemus, 2004 ;
minia, 2011 ). Swärd (2016) shows that in later stages of an inter-
rganizational project deeper forms of trust are needed due to increased
nterdependency. In each of the stages different governance arrange-
ent can be used ( Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998 ). 
.3. Trust and reciprocity 
Within project literature the concepts of trust and reciprocity
ave been used sparsely (cf. Kadefors, 2004 ; Maurer, 2010 ).
adefors (2004) adopts the concept of reciprocity to explain how ac-
ions of trust elicit co-operative behavior while actions of distrust elicit
elf-serving behavior. When turning to organization studies literature
e see that trust is understood to be developed in a reciprocal in-
eraction between partners ( Smets et al., 1999 ; Swärd, 2016 ) to re-
uce social complexity ( Poppo et al., 2008 ) and uncertainty ( Latusk
 Vlaar, 2018 ). For example, demonstrating vulnerability by taking a
arge risk builds trust in projects, while taking small risks may be in-
erpreted as a sign of distrust ( Murnighan, Malhotra, & Weber, 2004 ).
n his famous study of trade among Trobriand islanders, anthropologist
alinowski (1922) showed that an important condition for reciprocal
ction is that it is not performed because it is dictated by formal rules or
ole expectancies, but as a repayment for benefits received. Reciprocity
hus deepens the collaboration between project partners over time as
we owe others certain things because of what they have previously
one for us, because of history of previous interaction we have had with
hem ” ( Gouldner, 1960 : 172). 
Three types of reciprocal exchange are important for our study of
rust development ( Sahlins, 1973 ). The first type is generalized reci-
rocity which refers to putatively altruistic transactions, where ex-
hange takes place over an indefinite reimbursement period, with un-
efined equivalency of return and with a low self-interest. With gener-
lized reciprocity the flow of resources is sustained by prevailing social
elations and not stipulated by quality, quantity or time ( Sahlins, 1973 ).
n example of this is reciprocity between long-time partners in a project
lliance. The second type is balanced or symmetrical reciprocity, which
s a simultaneous exchange of equivalent resources without delay in
hich both parties mutually benefit. That is, recipients must reimburse
heir benefactors with something of roughly equivalent value within
 finite timeframe. We think this type of reciprocity to exist within
 contractor consortium or a project team. The third type is negative
eciprocity, characterised by timely, equivalent returns and high self-
nterest. Actors in this form seek to maximise utility at the expense of
thers. This is the most impersonal form of exchange when a contrac-
or tries to maximise their profit with additional payments. Reciprocity
s not stable but negotiated in practice, and failure to reciprocate in
nter-organizational settings is likely to generate negative reciprocity
 Van Marrewijk & Dessing, 2019 ). We agree with Swärd (2016) who353 tates that reciprocity might be the real glue that binds partners in inter-
rganizational projects. 
Our theoretical lens (for a visualization see Fig. 1 ) thus understands
he relational and contractual governance of a megaproject to be a tai-
ored arrangement consisting of a set of shared rules and procedures,
hich have to be enacted in daily governance practices. In a circular
rocess, these practices influence the collaboration, which in turn stim-
lates reciprocity, to further develop normative trust. Calculative trust
nfluence early phases of partnership development while normative trust
s developed through a reciprocal relationship and collaboration in later
hases. 
. Methods 
For obtaining an in-depth understanding of the practices of trust de-
elopment to govern a megaproject the first author, who is the SAA
roject director, used an auto-ethnographic field study ( Ellis, 2004 ;
ayano, 1979 ; Reed-Danahay, 1997 ). This approach helps to uncover
he sensitive, emotional and difficult to grasp practices of trust devel-
pment in megaprojects, which has been asked for by project scholars
 Benitez-Avila, Hartmann, & Dewulf, 2018 ; Maurer, 2010 ; Möllering &
ydow, 2019 ). Autoethnography results in a very rich practitioner per-
pective, which is arguably, except for a few examples ( Campbell, 2016 ;
homas, 2019 ), missing in project studies ( Van Marrewijk & Dess-
ng, 2019 ). Although project management studies are traditionally close
o practice, most project scholars agree that overcoming the knowledge
ap between academics and practitioners is challenging ( Söderlund &
aylor, 2012 ). Combining the roles of practitioner and researcher in an
utoethnography can help to bridge this gap. With others ( Söderlund &
aylor, 2012 ; Van Marrewijk & Dessing, 2019 ), we encourage this form
f engaged scholarship in which academic findings can be relevant to
ractitioners. However, the use of autoethnography brings along a num-
er of methodological topics which will be discussed below. 
.1. Autoethnography 
Autoethnography aims to systematically describe and analyze per-
onal experiences to improve the understanding of experiences in or-
anizations over a longer period of time ( Ellis, 2004 ). Autoethnogra-
hy brings together the ’self’ ( auto ), the culture ( ethno ) and the re-
earch process ( graphy ) ( Helps, 2017 ; Reed-Danahay, 1997 ). Based on
is or her own experience and knowledge of the context, the researcher
an give meaning to the cultural phenomenon under study ( Reed-
anahay, 1997 ; Van Maanen, 1995 ). Therefore, autoethnography is
enerally seen as more ’authentic’ than ’normal’ ethnography and en-
bles the writer to present a personal narrative and perspective ( Reed-
anahay, 1997 ). Such an autobiographical account produces a rich un-
erstanding of interpretations and personal judgements concerning the
eading of megaprojects ( Drouin, Shankaran, Van Marrewijk, & Müller,
020 ). 
Obviously, the auto-ethnographic approach takes some methodolog-
cal risks on the reliability, criticality, and integrity of the research
ndings ( Anderson, 2006 ). The double role of researcher/practitioner
 Helps, 2017 ) could result in self-absorption, in the development
f a tunnel vision or ’cultural nearsightedness’ ( Schwartz-Shea &
anow, 2012 ). We took divers measures to mitigate these risks. First,
s the triangulation of research findings, which is the combining of
ocuments, interviews, observations so that data can be compared
 Denzin, 1997 ). Second, the triangulation of researchers ( Denzin, 1997 )
ncreased the trustworthiness of the study and mitigated the risk of
iased observations. The fourth author, as a researcher, observed di-
erse workshops and executed interviews with SAA respondents. Fur-
hermore, the third and fourth author supervised, through regular meet-
ngs, the execution of the field study by the first author. This made it pos-
ible to critically discuss field findings, to question biased observations,
nd to reflect upon the first author’s frame of reference ( Helps, 2017 ;
H. Ruijter, A. van Marrewijk, M. Veenswijk et al. International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 351–364 














































































o  chwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012 ). The third and fourth author asked for
ollegial reflection of the second author at three different times during
he research process, while the second author was actively involved in
he critical writing of the findings. 
.2. Data collection 
The data for the study was collected through participant observation
f the first author in his simultaneous role of researcher and project di-
ector ( Ruijter, 2019 ). The double role of researcher and practitioner
s not unique in organizational research ( Helps, 2017 ). Participant ob-
ervation involves investigating, experiencing and representing social
ife occurring in a particular setting on a relatively long-term basis
 Cohen, 2000 ). The first author participated in all, but one, of the 28
orkshops, which were organized for employees of the commissioner,
he SAA program, and the contractor consortia (see Table 1 for an
verview). Almost all of the workshops, which lasted between three and
our hours, were recorded and transcribed in minutes. 
To validate the findings from participant observation, the first au-
hor conducted 12 interviews with key representatives of the SAA board
nd constructor consortia (respondents 1 to 12 in Table 2 ). The inter-
iews were typically organized in a neutral setting outside the office
nd lasted 1 to 1,5 h. In these interviews, the first author reflected
pon the findings and thus mitigated risks of possible biased perspec-
ive ( Anderson, 2006 ). To further increase the reliability of the study,
he fourth author independently executed 21 interviews in 2017/2018
o collect the opinions of key actors over dilemmas of commissioner and
ontractor in the SAA megaproject (respondents 13 to 32 in Table 2 ). In
he findings section we use quotes from the two sets of interviews, from
he workshop minutes and from project documentation. The interplay
etween these diverse sources strengthen the rich perspective on daily
rust development practices not earlier presented in project studies. 
.3. Data analysis 
The collected data was analyzed by using an interpretative approach
n which data is understood within the context of the case ( LeCompte
 Schensul, 2013 ). Such analysis strengthens claims made about actors’
nterpretations ( Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012 ). A four-round interpre-
ive method was engaged for this analysis ( LeCompte & Schensul, 2013 ).
n the first round, the researcher/project director went through all col-
ected data and selected narratives on trust development and resilient354 artnership and gave, in consultation with other SAA managers, mean-
ng to these narratives. This helped to increase reflexivity and to pre-
ented sympathetic interpretation ( Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012 ). In
he second round, we went through these narratives to find how trust de-
elopment was central and what workshops were used. We then catego-
ized six types of workshops dealing with trust development; (1) shared
alues, (2) dealing with dilemmas, (3) story-telling, (4) fishbowl, (5) the
hair and (6) role-playing. In the third round we analyzed the relation
f these workshops with the trust development stages of initiation, ne-
otiation, formation and operation ( Schilke & Cook, 2013 ). Based upon
his analysis we could connect the found workshops to the stages (see
able 1 ). Furthermore, we analyzed how each of the workshops con-
ributed to the trust development process in the studied project. In the
ourth and final round, all authors jointly debated, questioned and clar-
fied uncertainties, and further contextualized the case descriptions to
efine the final written text. 
. The governance of the SAA megaproject 
The SAA infrastructure project, for which plans were already being
ade back in the 1960s, involves a large-scale re-infrastructure and ad-
ancement of the main road network between Schiphol, Amsterdam and
lmere, with the aim of improving the accessibility and quality of life
n this densely populated region of the Netherlands. It includes the in-
rastructure of the longest land tunnel in the Netherland (3 km), and
urope’s largest aqueduct. After years of planning and discussion, a fi-
al decision was made in 2012, after which the realization started, pro-
ected to deliver in 2020. The impact of all this infrastructure work is
normous, especially on residents in close proximity and on road users.
ith regard to the latter, it is important that the region would not be
locked in’ during the implementation of the program. The accessibil-
ty of this densely populated and economically important part of the
etherlands has to be safeguarded during infrastructure. For this reason,
nd for manageability, the megaproject was therefore divided into five
eparate projects, here called 1 to 5. Project 1 (A10 realized in 2014) and
 (A9 Badhoevedorp-Holendrecht postponed to 2019–2026) fall outside
he time span of the study. Projects 2 (A1/A6), 3 (A9 Gaasperdammer-
eg or ‘GDW’) and 4 (A6 Almere) were respectively realized by the con-
ractors’ consortia SAAone, IXAS and Parkway6 (see Fig. 2 ). The five
rojects were planned to be realized in ’roof-tile’ fashion, which is in
uccession and partly overlapping in time. Consequently, at the time

































































Workshops to develop trust in the SAA megaproject. 
Stage # Date Participants No. of part. Workshop Time in hours 
Initiation 1. Mar 12, 2014 SAA Contract Managers 8 Defining values 4 
2. May 7, 2014 SAA Contract Managers 8 Defining values 4 
3. Oct 29, 2014 SAA program management, Project Managers and Contract Managers 16 Defining values 4 
4. Dec 4, 2014 SAA program management, Project Managers and Contract Managers 12 Defining values 4 
5. Feb 3, 2015 SAA project teams + A9B 14 Defining values 3 
6. Feb 11, 2015 SAA project teams + A9G 14 Defining values 3 
7. Feb 11, 2015 SAA project teams + A1A6 14 Defining values 3 
8. Feb 12, 2015 SAA project teams + A6A 14 Defining values 3 
9. Apr 9, 2015 SAA employees half yearly meetings 85 Defining values 4 
Negotiation 10. May 13, 2015 SAAone (A1/A6) commissioner and contractor 18 Dealing with dilemma’s 3,5 
11. Jun 15, 2015 IXAS (A9 GDW) commissioner and contractor 18 Dealing with dilemma’s 4 
12. Jun 17, 2015 Witteveen + Bos (A9 BAHO) comm authority and contractor 16 Dealing with dilemma’s 4 
13. Jun 18, 2015 SAA program management & Project Managers 11 Discussion of cases 3 
Formation 14. Oct 1, 2015 SAA program management & Project Managers 7 Storytelling: development of storytelling 3 
15. Oct 15, 2015 SAA employees half yearly meetings 100 ’The Chair’ 4 
16. Feb 2, 2016 SAA program management and SAAone 15 Fish bowl setup 2 
17. Apr 5, 2016 SAAone (A1/A6) commissioner and contractor 18 Storytelling 3 
18. Apr 14, 2016 Witteveen + Bos (A9 BAHO) comm authority and contractor 17 Storytelling 3 
19. Apr 21, 2016 SAA employees half yearly meetings 110 ’The Chair’ + presentation of stories 4 
20. May 25, 2016 IXAS (A9 GDW) commissioner and contractor 16 Storytelling 3 
21. Sept 29, 2016 SAA employees half yearly meetings 100 Exchange of experiences with partnership 4 
Operation 22. Mar 6, 2017 SAA program management and Project Managers 9 Role-playing practicing 3 
23. Apr 20, 2017 SAA employees half yearly meetings 120 Role-playing 4 
24. May 16, 2017 Parkway6 (A6 Almere) comm authority and contractor 20 Storytelling 2 
25. May 17, 2017 IXAS (A9 GDW) commissioner and contractor 18 Role-playing 3 
26. Aug 23, 2017 Young professionals of Commissioner and Volker Wessels 40 Role-playing 3 
27. Nov 14, 2018 Parkway 6, Almere municipality comm authority and contractor 15 Dealing with dilemma’s 2 
28. Nov 21, 2018 IXAS (A9 GDW) commissioner and contractor 20 Dealing with dilemma’s 3 
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Table 2 
List of interview respondents in the SAA megaproject. 
Resp. Team Organization Date 
1. Chief Procurement Officer Commissioner 21–12–2017 
2. Manager implementation market strategy Commissioner 21–12–2017 
3. Director (board member SAAone) Volker Infra 6–12–2017 
4. General director (board member SAAone) Boskalis Nederland 13–12–2017 
5. Contract manager A1/A6 Commissioner 27–11–2017 
6. EPCM project director SAAone BV 27–11–2017 
7 Project managerA9GDW Commissioner 20–12–2017 
8. Contract manager A9GDW Commissioner 20–12–2017 
9 EPCM project director IXAS 20–12–2017 
10. Contract manager A6 Almere Commissioner 19–12–2017 
11. SPC project director A6 Almere Parkway6 19–12–2017 
12. EPCM project director A6 Almere Parkway6 19–12–2017 
13. Contract manager A1/A6 Commissioner 6–3–2017 
14. Operational manager SAAone BV 22–2–2017 
15 Traffic manager SAA 17–2–2017 
16. Technical manager A1/A6 Commissioner 23–3–2017 
17. Stakeholder mngr A9GDW Commissioner 7–4–2017 
18. Manager A1/A6 Commissioner 6–4–2017 
19. Manager A6 Almere Parkway6 7–6–2017 
20. Asset manager A9GDW IXAS 12–6–2017 
21 Contract manager A6 Almere Commissioner 5–6–2017 
22. Manager Parkway6 16–5–2017 
23. Contract manager A9GDW Commissioner 6–7–2017 
24. Project director A6 Almere Parkway6 29–6–2017 
25. Manager A1/A6 Commissioner 24–7–2017 
26. Manager A6 Almere Parkway6 24–8–2017 
27. Stakeholder mngr A9GDW IXAS 20–9–2017 
28. Manager A9GDW Commissioner 25–9–2017 
29. Manager A1/A6 SAAone 2–11–2017 
30. Manager A1/A6 SAAone 3–11–2017 
31. Project manager A9GDW Commissioner 5–2–2018 
32 Project manager A6 Almere Commissioner 19–2–2018 
33. Operational manager A1/A6 SAAone 22–2–2018 



















 (delivered in 2017) and project 4 (in 2019) are completed one year
head on schedule, while project 3 is on time (2020). 
The bulk of the SAA program has been contracted through DBFM
Design, Build, Finance and Maintain) contracts. In these contracts the
ontractor is responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance
f the project for a period of approximately 20 years and for the pre-
nancing of the whole. The Department for Public Works and Water
anagement, locally known as Rijkswaterstaat but here further called
he Commissioner, is a Dutch governmental agency which manages356 ransport and water infrastructure in the Netherlands. During the de-
ign, construction and maintenance phase they pay for the availability
f (a piece of) infrastructure for the road user. The contractors are ex-
ected to conclude an agreement with a financier for the pre-financing,
hich will be repaid with the Commissioner’s periodic payments. Due
o this repayment regime, the contractors will do everything possible
o comply with the tight planning so they can meet their obligations to
he financer. The decisive factor here is the one-off payment that the
ontractors receive at the end of the construction phase. 






























































































































a  At the time of the data collection, the SAA program organization con-
isted of approximately 130 employees, of which about half were em-
loyed by the Commissioner and the other half from the private sector.
he five project teams were responsible for the megaproject’s prepara-
ion and management of the implementation by the various contractors
nd operated under the auspices of the central program management
nd a central planning control unit (see Appendix A ). All teams had the
ame structure in which the Contract Manager is responsible for man-
ging the contracting parties. The Stakeholder Manager is responsible
or the coordination with municipalities, provinces, road users, local
esidents and companies and agencies in the vicinity that are affected
irectly (e.g. noise nuisance) or indirectly (e.g. road traffic). The Tech-
ical Manager is responsible for formulating the substantive specifica-
ions for the contractor and assessing whether the specifications have
ctually been realized, while the Planning & Control Manager is respon-
ible for the operational management of the project and for identifying
nd controlling the various risks that can occur during the course of the
roject. Finally, the Project Director is responsible for the entire project
eporting to the Director General of the Commissioner. 
. Practices of trust development in the SAA megaproject 
The task of the SAA project management is to prepare and to man-
ge the implementation of the five projects in close collaboration with
he contractor consortia. The financial agreements and legal systems,
efined in the five DBFM contracts, helped to develop calculative trust
 Rousseau et al., 1998 ) between the Commissioner and the contractors.
You have to really understand what the project is about, because if
ou feel insecure about this you can fall back on the security of the con-
ract ” (interview respondent 8). However, the SAA management realizes
hat these contracts will never be able to account for all conceivable
ituations that might occur during the implementation of the project.
ccording to the SAA management, there will always be passages in
 contract that are unclear or are open to multiple interpretations. To
revent the falling back on calculative trust ( Rousseau et al., 1998 ), the
AA project management expressed the ambition to develop normative
rust ( Rousseau et al., 1998 ) by shifting the role of the commissioning
uthority with respect to the contractor from controlling to more facili-
ating. In return, the contractor is expected to see the (political) project
esponsibilities from the perspective of the commissioning authority.
his is what SAA management called resilient partnership; “an effective
ay to attain this balance, based on risk assessment and mutual trust,
hich you need to realize a project. This is not blind faith, but trust that
s based on transparency and the ability to explain ” (interview member
AA Board). 
The SAA project management used six different types of workshops
o intervene in the traditional collaboration between commissioner and
ontractor and thus develop normative trust; (1) shared values, (2) deal-
ng with dilemmas, (3) story-telling, (4) fishbowl, (5) the chair, and
6) role-playing. Workshops are frequently being used as interventions
 Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2016 ; Mirvis, 2019 ; Schein & Bennis, 1965 ).
or example, Mirvis (2019 : 62) uses the workshop of ‘mask-making’
n to learn managers to reflect upon their and each other’s identity.
inahan (2019) uses the ‘Argument of Obviousness’ workshop to ex-
lore and discuss differences between partners in inter-organizational
ollaboration. He encourages partners to give voice to the generaliza-
ion and stereotypes that each side holds out the other. Workshops can
e very helpful in reflecting upon collaborative behavior of public and
rivate partners in infrastructure projects ( Van Marrewijk, Veenswijk
 Clegg, 2014 ), to explore and discuss differences between partners in
nter-organizational collaboration Minahan (2019) , or to debrief on the
xperiences with collaboration, thus prompting reflection and learning
 Wagenheim, 2019 ). In the following sections we explain each workshop
nd their relation with the trust development stages of initiation, nego-
iation, formation and operation ( Schilke & Cook, 2013 ). We further
resent their impact on the trust building process, their relation with357 he other workshops, and their advantages and disadvantages. Finally,
or each workshop we come with supporting quotes from participants
f these workshops. 
.1. Initiation stage: the defining values workshops 
In the tender process, pre-collaboration dialogues between commis-
ioning authority, contractor and participating and licensing authority,
uch as municipalities, already started. “During the dialogue, the parties
ere allowed to say anything that they wished without legal commit-
ent ” (interview respondent 13). According to respondents, ensuring
n open discussion and the involvement of stakeholders, such as munic-
palities, during the dialogue phase, helped to learn each other’s goals
nd interests at an early stage; “the contract is primarily a means, highly
elevant of course, but not an objective in itself" (interview respondent
2). These first dialogues set the agenda for further exploration and de-
elopment of the resilient partnership between the Commissioner and
he contractor consortia through workshops. 
The SAA managers organized four internal workshops to explore the
ompetences and values needed for the governance of the megaproject,
ealizing that a resilient partnership is not a panacea. They referred to
he importance of bringing up doubts and dilemmas for discussion, and
o the courage and the space that employees need to do this; "we can set
 good example, but we can’t tell employees how they should do this"
minutes, 4 December 2014). Consultants helped to collect the view-
oints of contractors in order to define a set of important competences
nd core values for the partnership; empathy, predictability, flexibility,
imely, and supportiveness. 
The impact of this intervention on the trust building process is in the
roviding of a set of competences and related core values. We criticize
he overvaluing of such sets, as Alvesson and Sveningsson (2016) call
hese the ‘cloud of goodness’, values that one can’t oppose to. More im-
act had the openly discussing of goals, values, and risks, meaning, in
hich both Commissioner and contractor consortia must be vulnerable;
generally, we work opposed to each other, which asks for a lot of ef-
ort. It is a choice to go for an attitude that, at first side, appears to be
ulnerable. But at the end this is much better for the progress of the
egaproject. ” (interview respondent 14). The advantages of the initial
orkshops are in the setting of the stage for fertile collaboration dur-
ng the execution of the project. Such workshops have been mentioned
arlier in literature, for example, to create an alliance culture (Clegg,
003). The disadvantages are found in the dominant role of the Com-
issioner in this initial stage, with risks of contractors adapting without
eally being convinced. For more supporting quotes for the exploring
ollaboration workshops in the initial stage see Table 3 . 
.2. Negotiation stage: dealing with dilemmas workshops 
In the negotiation stage, roughly between May and June 2015, the
AA management organized three ‘dealing with dilemmas’ workshops.
hese workshops were held separate from the day-to-day project life to
ocus on dilemmas in finding a balance between following the contract
r focusing on the relation. “It was interesting and fascinating to get
way from our day-to-day work and talk about different perspectives
ith each other" (observations during workshop May 16, 2017). Such
eflections are perceived to be important for changing work routines
 Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009 ). In the workshops, examples from the project
ork floor, such as the dilemma on shared versus separated responsi-
ilities, were discussed by representatives of the Commissioner and the
ontractor consortium. The Commissioner supported the workshops as
the [resilient partnership] approach should not imply a subordinate po-
ition with respect to the contractor; instead, it should be about equality
nd partnership, I firmly believe in that" (minutes, June 17, 2015). Ef-
ort was needed to get people to reflect openly on their experiences and
ilemmas, and sometimes specific arrangements were needed. For ex-
mple, the Commissioner helped contractors to gain trust of external
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Table 3 
Supporting quotes for the defining values workshops in the initiation 
stage. 
Supporting quotes Sources 
“As dialogue team we conducted open and 
transparent discussions with the candidates. 
We did not avoid any questions. If we did not 
know how something works, then we said so. 
We were vulnerable, but not naïve. ”
Interview 
Respondent 13 
"It [resilient partnership] should not become 





“By communicating during the dialogue – and 
not avoiding difficult matters – the project 
objectives acquire depth and clarity. ”
Interview 
Respondent 21 
“Would it not be better for Commissioner to 
take a facilitating role, to enable this 
contractor to implement its plans as 




“Soon after the contract was awarded, we 
asked: ‘When are we going to sit down 
together?’ The reaction of the contractor was 
somewhat reluctant: ’Let’s do our own thing 
now, we will get together later on’. ”
Interview 
Respondent 10 
“This [resilient partnership] is an effective 
way to attain this balance, based on risk 
assessment and mutual trust, which you need 
to realize a project. This is not blind faith, but 
trust that is based on transparency and the 










































Supporting quotes for the dealing with dilemmas workshops in the 
negotiation stage. 
Supporting quotes Source 
“Although everybody’s intentions are good, 
we frequently work fragmented, to such an 
extent that out of frustration we sometimes 
conflict. If you then understand that it is an 
illusion that we understand each other, that is 
a good starting point. ”
Interview 
Respondent 14 
“We often see behavior that is intended to 
ensure that the risk is borne as long as 
possible by another party. Instead of shifting 
the risks, we should focus more on jointly 





“He didn’t have to do this. He could have 
said; ‘time delay is not my problem’, On the 
other side, if we have financial loss, we used 




"If the parties trust each other and you look 





“Discussion doesn’t always result in a 
solution; we can also agree to disagree ”
Interview 
Respondent 26 
“Although we encountered setbacks on this 
project, the most important gain was that we 
were able to prevent delays and inefficiencies 
by working together. The decisive factor was 
how we dealt with the setbacks. This requires 
something from both sides, in a technical 




“In this way you reduce ambiguity. Just 
openly discuss your worries, then the other 
would do the same and then you can try to 
































S  takeholders; “trust makes things possible that were undiscussable ear-
ier ” (interview respondent 15). Furthermore, we saw recurring strug-
les among employees of both the Commissioner and the contractors
oncerning the search for a balance between the development of calcu-
ative trust by focusing on the contract or the development of norma-
ive trust by prioritizing personal relations; “deploying this partnership
n practice is still a struggle because it also concerns fundamental inter-
sts of people and organizations" (minutes, June 17, 2015). The tensions
ver interests were clearly noticeable as actors were hesitating to focus
pon the relational partnership. 
The dilemmas workshops supported reciprocal acts of helping each
ther; “we can help the contractor by allowing them to use an extra lane
or the infrastructure of the tunnel ” (interview respondent 21). This was
et with a surprise; “it was remarkable that the commissioning author-
ty accommodated us, not in a financial sense, but by giving us per-
ission to close the reversible lane and modify the plan. They were
ot obligated to do so in any way (interview respondent 20). In return,
he constructors did their best to understand the societal and political
ressures that the Commissioner found themselves in this large project.
There are many opportunities when we really start thinking based on
he underlying mandate of the project; from the beginning of the project
ou can then become more involved with the social benefits" (observa-
ion workshop June 17, 2015). 
This intervention helped partners to make a first careful step in
he development of resilient partnership as the collaboration philoso-
hy now had to be enacted in practice. The workshops helped to de-
elop a common language on which project partners could openly and
ransparently discuss dilemmas related to the work in “the right atmo-
phere" (interview respondent 10). The dealing with dilemma’s work-
hops helped to reflect upon conflicts and make conscious and shared
ecisions over dilemmas, supported by project partners. This is in line
ith Swärd (2016) , who reports that after a tunnel blast accident com-
issioner and contractor openly discussed how to respond to future in-
idents. In effect, the discussions in the dealing with dilemmas work-
hops focused on finding joint solutions; "I think that our people prefer
o work in this way, it helps us all to achieve our objectives more effec-
ively" (interview respondent 11). The disadvantage was found in the
ack of a clear structure, which failed to uncover the diverse meaning358 f incidents. For more supporting quotes for the exploring collaboration
orkshops in the initial stage see Table 4 . 
.3. Formation stage: storytelling workshops 
In the formation stage, storytelling workshops with employees of
oth commissioner and constructors were used in the trust develop-
ent. Therefore, the concept of storytelling was introduced to the SAA
anagement in a workshop on the 1st of October 2015. “Narratives
rovide more space to clarify the experience from multiple perspec-
ives; it is more interactive. This is a way to incorporate reflection, not
nly for yourself, but also collectively. ” (interview respondent 9). The
orkshops offered structural frames for checking how participants have
nterpreted collaboration by jointly developing narratives over experi-
nces, events and incidents. “Unfortunately, it is often an illusion that
arious participants really understand each other immediately" (Respon-
ent 5, observation February 2, 2016). These different interpretations
requently happen when dealing with (small) changes during the exe-
ution phase when the Commissioner thinks that all is settled, but the
ontractor thinks ’let’s wait and see, a real decision has not yet been
ade’. Changes come frequently in infrastructure megaprojects: "then
e think we’ve made an agreement, and then for the umpteenth time it
hanges again" (interview respondent 27). In such a situation, people go
ome with a different interpretation of the discussion. Others state that
when you realize that it is an illusion that you understand each other,
hat’s a good start ” (interview respondent 6). For the contractor, every
hange costs money, so they prefer to have a formal change of plan in
hich everything is specified and calculated before anything is done. At
 certain point, everyone is waiting for the other, leading to delays and
igher costs. 
Stories over events and incidents function almost in the same way as
wärd (2016) discussed the events causing to develop trust. Examples of
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Table 5 
Supporting quotes for the storytelling workshops in the formation 
stage. 
Supporting quotes Sources 
“One can best reflect upon your own behavior 
instead of blaming the other, because you 




“Narratives provide more space to clarify the 








“The narratives make it easy to start 
conversations with others, but they also touch 
on many aspects about which you say ‘I ‘m 
doing that already’. ”
Interview 
Respondent 5 
“We planned solid precautionary measures, 
but when I saw that huge structure 
[assembled railroad bridge] alongside the 
road, ready for transport, I still became a 




“The awareness-building process is crucial, 
and by writing the narratives you are really 
engaged; this compels people to think much 
more deliberately about what they are doing. ”
Interview 
Respondent 7 
"The narratives make it easy to start 
conversations with others, but they also touch 
on many aspects about which you say ’I’m 







































Supporting quotes for fish bowl setting in the formation stage. 
Supporting quotes Resources 
“They know they can call us, for example 
when a contractor anticipates on a difficult 
meeting with the local municipality ”
Interview 
Respondent 15 
“We are helped by others; ‘he shouldn’t you 
forget this’, or ‘you have to do that’. We know 
each other’s roles by heart now. ”
Interview 
Respondent 16 
“I have the feeling that resilient partnership, 
and the way in which we have dealt with 
each other in this project, have brought the 
worlds of the commissioning authority and of 
the contractor closer together, and I think this 


















































o  uch narratives were over the transport of the assembled railroad bridge
o the final location by special transport wagons in which the contractual
isk of transport by the contractor would become a political risk for the
ommissioner of closing down the highway when the transport failed.
herefore, a second opinion of university professors was asked for by
he commission; "Don’t you trust us? …. of course, I understood that the
ommissioning authority stuck his neck out with that second opinion. ”
interview respondent 3). In the storytelling workshop, “it is important
o really understand each other’s world: what do you actually hear in
ur message, how do you interpret it? (interview respondent 5). 
The storytelling workshops facilitate the uncovering of multiple,
nd sometimes opposed, understandings of experiences with collab-
ration. Openly discussing sensitive (contract) issues and tensions in
ollaboration were earlier observed to be problematic in the execu-
ion of Dutch infrastructure megaprojects ( Sminia, 2011 ). Storytelling
orkshops have been used earlier to increase managers’ self-awareness
 Mirvis, 2019 ). The disadvantage of the storytelling workshops was that
articipants had little or no experience with reflection and tended to re-
ct judgmentally. Therefore, a process consultant was needed to coach
he writing of narratives in the workshops. For more supporting quotes
or the exploring collaboration workshops in the initial stage see Table 5 .
.4. Formation stage: discussing in a fishbowl setup 
The formation stage to develop trust in the resilient partnership was
ontinued with the program component: discussing in a ’fishbowl setup’.
he spatial setting is a joint session in which participants from both the
ommissioner and contractors sit in the center of a room, while their
eflections over mutual cooperation are observed by other participants
ho sit around in a circle. Participants learned in this session how they
ommunicated from very different perspectives, which frequently re-
ulted in ’trench warfare’; “getting into the trenches is simple but getting
ut of them is a different task entirely as everyone has to realize that
he other party did not push you into the trenches, you got into them
ourself". This awareness did not immediately result in a solution and a
ollow-up session was needed to tackle the impasse by taking a different
pproach by asking for joint clarification from within their respective359 rganizations. This compels participants to communicate more clearly
ith each other and determine whether the message has really arrived.
The impact of the fishbowl setup on the trust development pro-
ess was limited as this was used only once. The advantage of this
ntervention is that involved actors are observed by their colleagues,
ho thus are trained in observation and reflection. These are compe-
ences that need to be trained in the construction sector ( Van Marrewijk
t al., 2014 ). This workshop can be used independently of other work-
hops in different stages of the trust development process. The disadvan-
age is in the rational focus of actors, especially with technical experts
 Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2016 ), trying to convince others with argu-
ents. Although these type of workshops include a debriefing on par-
icipants’ experience, which is supposed to prompt reflection and learn-
ng ( Wagenheim, 2019 ), the effect was, according to participants, low.
or more supporting quotes for the exploring collaboration workshops
n the initial stage see Table 6 . 
.5. Formation stage: the chair workshops 
A specific type of storytelling workshop was ’The Chair’ workshop,
ntroduced at a SAA employee meeting. This workshop was based on the
utch television program ’De Stoel’ [The Chair] symbolizing an open
iscussion of lifestyles. In the same way, SAA employees were encour-
ged to share their stories, fears and dilemmas with their colleagues;
we had noticed that people were shy at the beginning and afraid to
e vulnerable. By creating a relaxed, living room-like atmosphere, we
hought that it would be easier for people to share their dilemmas openly
ith others" (interview member SAA board). To help get this process
tarted, several experienced speakers among the employees were asked
o tell their stories, but during subsequent meetings it became easier
or people to join. Nervously, one of the speakers started discussing the
nterplay between the auditors working for the Commissioner and the
uperintendents of the contractors. His statement ‘empathetic but firm’
as popular with the SAA employees; that you are empathetic but firm
ith each other; “fairness is a key to trust and transparency ” (interview
espondent 27). Another speaker stressed the importance to first have
n open conversation over bottlenecks before referring to specifications
n the contract. Being transparent and open over one’s interests is very
ncommon in the infrastructure sector ( Van Marrewijk et al., 2014 ). In
 final example, a speaker used the metaphor of kiting; “You can fly a
ite with only a single string, but to steer it you need two ”. He argued
hat this is also true for the relationship between the Commissioner and
ontractor: one string for steering the relationship according to the con-
ract, calculative trust, and one string for steering the relation towards
ooperation, normative trust. 
The Chair workshops impacted the trust building process by provid-
ng SAA project employees a safe environment to share their dilemmas
ith their colleagues. This helped them to learn from each other’s expe-
iences, much in the same way as Mirvis (2019 : 59) describes the CEO
f Novo Nordisk sitting on a chair in front of a group sharing his story
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Table 7 
Supporting quotes for the storytelling workshops in the formation 
stage. 
Supporting quotes Source 




"For the employee meeting in October 2015, I 
had to coax employees to tell their stories. 
But for the subsequent meeting in April 2016, 




“If the other party listens to you, and you 
know that the commissioning authority is 
aware of your problems and interests, this 
makes a big difference. This is especially the 
case if you can subsequently discuss the 
situation with each other 
Interview 
Respondent 14 
“it is important that we, as Project Managers, 
provide a safe environment for employees and 






"Dare to make decisions, not only as a 
















































Supporting quotes for role playing in the operations stage. 
Supporting quotes Source 
“The commissioner has played a mediating 
role; they really did help to sell the idea of 
specification by the contractor to the CIV ”. 
Interview 
Respondent 20 
"I was surprised that the contractor was not 
at all negative about Commissioner. I became 
especially aware that you should sometimes 
be even more explicit about the background 




play Aug 2017 
“You also have to give each other something, 
and that happens far too little because it is in 
conflict with the contract. If we had adhered 
strictly to the contract for this project, we 
would have been worse off, because the 




"It was good to stand in each other’s shoes 
with this role-play. Only then do you 




play Aug 2017 
“In practice, you sometimes work together in 
the interest of the commissioning authority 








































S  ith younger managers. Furthermore, it helped employees to increase
heir capabilities to reflect, before engaging with contractors. However,
he impact of the Chair workshops was low as the constructors were not
nvolved. For more supporting quotes for the exploring collaboration
orkshops in the initial stage see Table 7 . 
.6. Operation stage: negotiating over balanced reciprocity through 
ole-playing 
In the operation stage, reflecting upon negotiations over the
endgame’ through role-playing was used to further develop trust in the
AA megaproject. Early in 2017, the management of SAA decided to
ractice the impending completion of the first major DBFM project, the
1/A6, and reflect upon the ‘endgame’ between the Commissioner and
ontractor by simulating it in a role-play; “a well experienced prepara-
ion helps to focus when time has come (interview respondent 16). Be-
ause the members of the project team had sufficient experience, they
ould quickly put themselves into the position of the other party. This
esulted in fruitful discussions, and it was interesting to see how people
esponded to the behavior that was displayed. For example, when one
arty used the term ’trust’ ("you can trust me"), this was likely to be in-
erpreted by the other party as ’distrust’ ("yeah, sure"). It was concluded
hat one cannot build trust by just using words; one has to show trust.
ue to the way in which issues that had arisen during the implementa-
ion period were dealt with jointly, mutual trust was developed in the
elationship. 
Due to the success of this game situation, it was decided to continue
his in a broader context. Specifically, for this purpose, a role-play was
eveloped with a number of settings that had actually occurred in prac-
ice and was first played during an employee meeting at SAA in April
017. For the role-play, the participants were assigned to roles differ-
nt than their own, and events were introduced while participants were
iven a ’secret’ personal agenda. Afterwards the teams shared their ex-
eriences in order to learn and acquire insight into mutual concerns.
ater on, the role-playing was used together with one of the contrac-
ors (IXAS). We observed that the players, probably because they were
laced in unaccustomed roles, exaggerated their positions more than
hey would have done in reality. As a result, the various interests of par-
ies could be expressed more effectively, and due to the exaggeration of
he behavior in a game situation the insight of the participants could be
mplified into action/ reaction principles. 
The impact of this intervention on the trust building process was
ound in the uncovering the patterns of collaboration by putting oneself
n the position of the other. By doing so, empathy and normative trust360 ere created. Much in the same way as roles were trained in workshops
n public private collaboration observed by Van Marrewijk et al. (2014) .
hese SAA workshops were organized for the ‘endgame’ but can also be
sed as interventions in earlier project stages. The advantage of such
ole play workshop is closely related to its disadvantage; these are fictive
ituations that are played by others. On the one hand, it affords actors
o experiment with new behavior ( Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009 ), while at
he other hand, role play can be interpreted as fictive. There is a risk
f an instrumental performance with little meaning to those involved,
s was the case a workshop with junior middle managers observed by
lvesson and Sveningsson (2016) . For more supporting quotes for the
xploring collaboration workshops in the initial stage see Table 8 . 
To summarize the findings of the workshops’ contribution to the trust
uilding process in the SAA megaproject, we present Table 9 here. 
. Discussion 
This paper aimed to investigate the practices of trust development
sed to enhance the collaboration between public and private partners
n the governance of the SAA infrastructure megaproject. The study
ound that calculative trust ( Rousseau et al., 1998 ) between the Commis-
ioner and the contractors was developed through financial agreements
nd legal systems, defined in five DBMF contracts. However, given the
istory of laborious collaboration and weak institutional trust in the
utch infrastructure sector ( Priemus, 2004 ; Sminia, 2011 ), the Com-
issioner made great effort to develop normative trust ( Rousseau et al.,
998 ) through the establishing of a resilient partnership with the con-
ractors. The findings showed that six different types of workshops have
een used to do so; (1) shared values, (2) dealing with dilemmas, (3)
tory-telling, (4) fishbowl, (5) the chair, and (6) role-playing. These
orkshops were implemented during four stages of partnership devel-
pment. These insights contribute to the megaproject debate on gover-
ance, trust development, and public-private collaboration. 
.1. Practices of governing 
The first contribution is to the debate on the governance of megapro-
ects ( Brunet & Aubry, 2016 ; Müller, 2012 ; Pitsis et al., 2014 ; Van Mar-
ewijk et al., 2016 ). The findings in our study indicate that, according to
he Commissioner, pre-arranged contractual agreements, DBFM in the
AA case, insufficiently provide blueprints for successful collaboration.
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Table 9 
The contribution of workshops to the trust development process in the SAA megaproject. 
Workshops Practice Contribution to trust development 
Initiation stage: defining values for 
partnership 
Defining values Reflecting on the needed partnership 
Exploring competences and values needed for 
the governance 
Partners showed willingness to collaborate 
Openly discussing of goals, values, and risks 
A set of competences and related core values 
Sharing of core values with contractors 
Partners showed vulnerability 
Negotiation stage: discussing micro 
dilemmas 
Dealing with dilemma’s Openly discussing dilemmas caused by the 
governance arrangement 
Reciprocal acts of helping each other 
Sharing personal doubts and dilemmas 
Partners developed a common language 
Joint opportunities 
Shared decision making over dilemmas 
Balanced reciprocal relationship 
Formation stage: reflection on incidents, 
experiences and events 
Storytelling Jointly construction of narratives over 
collaboration incidents, experiences and 
events 
Structural frames for checking how 
participants come to interpretation 
Uncovering of multiple, and sometimes opposed, understandings 
Openly discussing sensitive (contract) issues 
Understanding each other’s interests 
Coming to shared interpretations of incidents, experiences and 
events 
Discussing in a fishbowl setup Joint sharing of experiences on the 
collaboration between commissioner and 
contractor 
Preventing the start of a ’trench warfare’ 
Learning to observe and reflect 
Tackle of impasses 
Coming to shared interpretations 
Breaking through impasses 
The Chair Expressing of personal viewpoints on issues 
by SAA employees of all levels 
Creating a safe environment 
Showing vulnerability to colleagues 
Personal viewpoints and dilemma’s 
Operation stage: negotiating balanced 
reciprocity 
Role-playing Preparing for expected difficult situations, 
resulting from the governance arrangement 
Uncovering patterns of collaboration 
Empathy over each other’s position 
Jointly anticipating project’s ending 



























































o  lthough contractual governance shapes relational norms oriented to
ncourage mutual reliable attitudes based on trust ( Benitez-Avila, Hart-
ann, & Dewulf, 2018 ), our findings show that an enormous effort, both
n time and effort, had to be paid for enacting the resilient partnership
hilosophy into practices. Therefore, given these efforts and the tempo-
al, dynamic, and complex character of infrastructure megaprojects, it
s no surprise that the enactment of partnership philosophies frequently
ails (e.g. Van Marrewijk et al., 2016 ). 
Indeed, normative governance arrangements, such as the resilient
artnership philosophy, run the risk of becoming a hyperreality
 Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2016 ), disconnected from daily practice of
roject employees. To enact the resilient partnership, employees of Com-
issioner and contractors had to develop a common language over cul-
ural values. Frequently, ‘cultural talk’ is alien to employees in technol-
gy oriented organizations ( Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2016 ). Therefore,
he SAA management organized a series of workshops to further ex-
lore the partnership model and the practical dilemmas related to the
overnance arrangement and come to a shared understanding of this
odel. This is in line with Carson et al. (2006) who stated that rela-
ional contracts are not robust to ambiguity in perceptions of the envi-
onmental context. Furthermore, the findings show that in order to en-
ct governance arrangements, Commissioner and contractors’ employ-
es had to openly discuss dilemmas, joint reflect upon incidents, tell
ersonal stories, practice vulnerability, and to engage in role-playing.
his quest for much more effort than writing down tailored arrange-
ents in which shared sets of coordination, procedures and rules are
efined ( Ahola et al., 2014 ). These found practices of governing meet
anderson’s (2012) critics of commissioners’ illusion of foresightedness
o deal with future unexpected events. Contractual agreements, even
hose with a partnership philosophy, can’t ensure smooth collaboration
n megaprojects. The findings of our study show that micro-processes of t  
361 overning are not emerging spontaneously ( Sanderson, 2012 ), but are
anaged carefully through workshops. 
.2. Stages of trust development 
The second contribution of our study is to the debate on the de-
elopment of trust in (mega)projects ( Kadefors, 2004 ; Munns, 1995 ;
wärd, 2016 ; Wong et al., 2000 ). Our findings show that the SAA
egaproject went through the four stages of trust development, as in-
icated by Schilke and Cook (2013) , in which both calculative and
ormative trust were established sequentially and simultaneously. The
egaproject started with contractual specifications, detailed moni-
oring, and rewards and penalties for availability of the road, all
greed upon in the DBFM contract, to develop calculative trust. In-
rastructure megaprojects frequently start with little institutional trust
 Sminia, 2011 ). Therefore they start with contractual specifications and
etailed monitoring to prevent opportunistic behavior ( Müller et al.,
013 ; Van Marrewijk et al., 2016 ). This finding is in line with schol-
rs assuming that contractual control diminish non-calculative trust
 Lumineau, 2017 ), or with scholars thinking that contractual arrange-
ents are needed when trust is missing between partners in inter-
rganizational relationships ( Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand & Nooteboom,
005 ). 
In the initial stage, workshops were organized in which normative
rust was developed through agreeing upon a shared set of project val-
es. In the negotiation stage, these values were then enacted through
oint workshops on dealing with dilemmas caused by governance ar-
angements and thus helped to strengthen the calculative trust between
ommissioner and contractors. In the formation stage the development
f normative trust dominated the agenda, while in the operation stage
he calculative trust was built through the role-playing workshops fo-






























































































































i  used upon the preparing of commissioner and contractors for the deliv-
ry of the contract. Swärd (2016) suggests that deeper forms of trust can
e found in later stages. However, based upon the findings, we think it
s difficult to speak of deep and shallow trust; we rather see a temporary
ntangled process of calculative and normative trust development over
ime, which is named swift trust by Meyerson et al. (1996) . These find-
ngs support scholars assuming calculative and normative trust are to be
eveloped simultaneously (e.g. Camén, Gottfridsson & Rundh, 2011 ).
e have shown that trust development is not just developed through
oincidental events as Swärd (2016) found, but through a laborious pro-
ess of improving employees’ capability to reflect, of jointly reflecting
pon dilemmas, and of negotiating balanced reciprocity when solving
roblems. 
.3. Trust and reciprocity in megaprojects 
The third contribution is to the debate on trust development in inter-
rganizational relations ( Latusk & Vlaar, 2018 ; Sydow, 1998 ). The found
ractices of trust development show that they were organized to sup-
ort a balanced reciprocal relationship ( Sahlins, 1973 ) between commis-
ioner and contractor consortia. This sounds obvious, but keeping a bal-
nced reciprocal relationship is actually very difficult ( Van Marrewijk &
essing, 2019 ), especially given the shadows of the past ( Poppo et al.,
008 ), which is in the Dutch infrastructure sector a lack of institu-
ional trust ( Priemus, 2004 ; Sminia, 2011 ). Balanced reciprocity was
aintained, for example, through securing the exchanges of viewpoints
nd interests, and allowing for solutions that helped constructors in ex-
hange for societal issues taken into account. As reciprocal relations are
ot stable but change over time ( Van Marrewijk & Dessing, 2019 ), bal-
nced reciprocity needed to be negotiated in practice during the differ-
nt stages of the partnership development. For example, this was done
n the dealing with dilemmas workshops, the role-playing workshops
nd in the case of the risky transport of the rail bridge by negotiating a
econd opinion in exchange for security. Mechanisms that threaten bal-
nced reciprocity are the drifting apart of partners, the claiming of more
ork by contractors, of the pushing of risks to the contractors. This can
urn balanced reciprocity into negative reciprocity. We agree with oth-
rs ( Munns, 1995 ; Swärd, 2016 ) that shown trust will be reciprocated
ith behavior that validates trust. The SAA metaphor was that of a mat-
ress that was filled with trust in times of prosperity, and when you fall
ogether, your fall is broken by the mattress. Balanced reciprocity thus
uffer to overcome failures. 
.4. Workshops as change interventions in the collaboration of public and 
rivate partners 
Finally, the findings in the SAA study show the potential of or-
anizing workshops as interventions in the collaboration of commis-
ioner and contractors in infrastructure megaprojects. In many coun-
ries, programs have been undertaken to radically change this diffi-
ult collaboration, affording greater efficiency, transparency and ac-
ountability (e.g. Adamson & Pollington, 2006 ; Sminia, 2011 ). Con-
truction megaprojects can be powerful means to evoking changes
 Bresnen, Goussevskaia & Swan, 2005 ) as they can be understood as
utonomous, temporary trading zones ( Lenfle & Söderlund, 2018 ). In
hese zones, project partners negotiate over work practices, narratives,
alues, norms and perspectives ( Van Marrewijk et al., 2014 ) to explore
ollaboration ( Minahan, 2019 ). For example, the first workshop specif-
cally focused upon the core values for the partnership; empathy, pre-
ictability, flexibility, timely, and supportiveness. All six found work-
hops were supportive in establishing a resilient partnership, aimed to
hange collaborative behavior between the Commissioner and contrac-
ors. Already in the 1965 ′ s Schein and Bennis (1965) stated that labo-
atory training, which is the putting together of employees in reflective
xperience-based learning sessions, is directed towards intervention and
hange, trying to influence professional and organizational roles. 362 The six workshops were organized in close relation to the daily work-
ng practices of project employees. This bottom-up approach is sup-
orted by Tsoukas and Chia (2002) who perceive organizational change
s an on-going change, something that occurs in the everyday interac-
ion of employees. In the workshops, employees reflected on personal
xperiences with dilemma’s, incidents and events and thus prompting
eflection and learning ( Wagenheim, 2019 ). Frequently, change work-
hop turn out to be an instrumental performance with little meaning
o those involved ( Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2016 ). This was the case
ith the Fishbowl workshop. Therefore, discussions in the workshops
an be either develop into a generative dialogue ( Thomas, Sargent &
ardy, 2011 ), supporting change actions, or in a degenerative dialog
 Thomas et al., 2011 ), obstructing change, depending the way in which
eaning is constructed over time. In sum, workshops can thus be under-
tood as transformational, involving a sense of non-hierarchical equal-
ty, togetherness, and common purpose when the cathartic liminal state
s collectively experienced. 
. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the practices of trust development through
orkshops to enhance the collaboration between public and private
artners in the governance of the SAA infrastructure megaproject. The
tudy has been executed through an auto-ethnographic research ap-
roach ( Anderson, 2006 ), which helped to uncover in-depth practices
f trust development across public-private boundaries, as has been
sked for by scholars ( Latusk & Vlaar, 2018 ; Maurer, 2010 ; Möllering
 Sydow, 2019 ). The study contributes to the debate on governance
n megaprojects ( Benitez-Avila, Hartmann, & Dewulf, 2018 ; Brunet &
ubry, 2016 ; Müller, 2012 ), showing how to make a normative gov-
rnance arrangement robust. Furthermore, the study contributes to the
ebate on trust building in megaprojects ( Kadefors, 2004 ; Munns, 1995 ;
wärd, 2016 ; Wong et al., 2000 ) with Schilke & Cook’s (2013) four
tages of trust development, which helped the exploration of trust devel-
pment over time. In these stages, balanced reciprocity ( Sahlins, 1973 )
as negotiated in practice, thus buffering the potential loss of trust
hrough conflicts between megaproject partners. Finally, the study con-
ributes to the debate on change of public-private collaboration in
egaprojects ( Bresnen et al., 2005 ; Van Marrewijk et al., 2014 ). Work-
hops can have, when seriously organized, transformational potential to
hange collaborative behavior of project partners. 
The limitations of the study are found in the risks of the autoethnog-
aphy method ( Anderson, 2006 ). This method, in which the researcher
s also practitioner, has risks of self-absorption, tunnel vision and bias
 Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012 ). To mitigate these risks, we took
easurements to guarantee academic rigor by organizing data- and
esearcher-triangulation ( Denzin, 1997 ). Are the findings on the Dutch
AA case limited by their cultural context? We think that role-playing,
penly discussing your personal dilemmas, showing vulnerability and
tory-telling can be translated to a different national context. We under-
tand reciprocity and trust to be global phenomena ( Malinowski, 1922 )
nd do think that the stages of trust development and the efforts of part-
ers in megaprojects to develop both calculative and normative trust
hrough meaningful workshops are universal. However, as trust is based
pon emotional bonds ( Wong et al., 2008 ) and acts of giving back can
ake many forms, both material and immaterial ( Gouldner, 1960 ), we
nderstand trust development to be culturally influenced. 
Future research should focus on the multi-levelness of trust devel-
pment as the building of institutional trust from positive project expe-
iences is not well understood. We see successful trust development in
ndividual megaprojects (e.g. Clegg et al., 2002 ), but after termination,
hese projects leave little or no traces at organizational and institutional
evels. Future studies could investigate what mechanism hinder devel-
ped trust in the governance of megaprojects to be institutionalized. 
The findings from our study inform practitioners that trust building
n a public-private partnership is a laborious process. The conditions































































































R  or a successful process include different enablers. At the front end of a
egaproject, the right atmosphere between the public private collabo-
ation in the tendering phase is needed to discuss each other’s interests.
fter selection, partners then explore a joint philosophy of collabora-
ion and related set of values. The right framing is here important, is
here a societal or national trend, such as for example ‘rethinking project
anagement’ in the UK ( Cicmil, Williams & Thomas, 2006 ), to connect
o? Following this, the impact of the initiator, which frequently is the
ublic commissioner, must be strong. The initiator needs to increase
he reflective capability of their employees, in order to organize work-
hops to reflect upon issues and dilemmas in the collaboration between
ommissioner and contractor. Intervention instruments such as story-
elling, role-playing and observing are used to reflect upon daily col-
aboration. Paradoxically, trust development should always be on the
genda of the project board, while at the same time trust should not be
iscussed too often, risking the loss of trust. The involvement of pro-
ess experts to guarantee quality and progress is necessary. During ex-
cution, a balanced reciprocal relation should be strived for, something
hat is not stable but should be negotiated over time ( Van Marrewijk &
essing, 2019 ). 
ppendix A. Organizational chart of the SAA program 
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